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Sri Lanka's Voting Coincidences with Major Powers in the United Nations General Assembly

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Abstract: *This study compares Sri Lanka's voting behaviour with that of major powers in the United Nations General Assembly between 2009 and 2024 across issues pertaining to the three Pillars of the United Nations - Peace and Security, Human Rights, and Development. The findings reveal that Sri Lanka's voting coincidences on multiple issue areas are higher with powers such as Russia, China, and India, than with the United Kingdom, France, and especially the United States. Through visualizing and analysing the voting coincidence rates, a nuanced mix of ideological affinities, pragmatic considerations, and principled stances, are assessed to be the factors driving Sri Lanka's voting behaviour. Highlighting Sri Lanka's diplomatic agility as a small state navigating complex geopolitical dynamics whilst pursuing its national interests and maintaining and its bilateral relationships. Further, the study cautions as to the limitations in interpreting a country's foreign policy through UNGA voting patterns alone.*

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Table of Contents

1.0. Introduction	4
1.1. Voting Patterns in the United Nations General Assembly	4
1.2. Small States and Multilateralism	5
1.3. Sri Lanka as a Small State	6
1.4. Examining Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy through UNGA Voting	7
2.0. Theoretical Framework	8
2.1. Understanding UNGA Voting Behaviour	8
2.2. Considerations in Analysing Voting Coincidence	9
3.0. Research Focus	11
3.1. Major Powers in Focus	11
3.2. UNGA Cases Selected	12
4.0. Methodology	15
4.1. Measuring Voting Coincidence	16
4.2. Interpretation of Voting Coincidence Rates	16
4.3. Application of Theoretical Insights	17
5.0. Results	19
5.1. P1 – Peace and Security	19
5.2. P2 – Human Rights	20
5.3. P3 – Development	21
6.0. Analysis	22
6.1. P1 – Peace and Security	22
6.2. P2 – Human Rights	23
6.3. P3 – Development	24
6.4. Analysis of Cases by Political Administrations	25
6.5. Sri Lanka's Voting Coincidence with BRICS countries	33
7.0. Conclusions	35
References	39
Appendix: UNGA Voting Data	46

1.0. Introduction

1.1. Voting Patterns in the United Nations General Assembly

Although being non-binding, the act of voting on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has since its inaugural session in 1945 become a focal point for research into the foreign policies of its member states, as it provides a direct means to observe a state's foreign policy positions (Bailey et al, 2015, p. 1 - 2; Kim & Russet, 2014, pp. 629). Contemporary studies regarding UNGA voting behaviour has increased in scope and complexity as they can provide valuable information on the foreign policy inclinations of a state (Bailey et al, 2015, p. 20 – 21). This method of investigation has provided many revelations concerning the foreign policy attitudes of states, with studies discussing the behavioural and issue focused aspects that determine the voting patterns of states at the UNGA, as analyzing a states voting behaviour at the UNGA can help point to the underlying causes and reasons of a state's foreign policy preferences (Kim & Russet, 2014, p. 629 - 630). "Despite being non-binding, these voting records have long been used to explore member states' policy preferences and understand their political proximities on global issues" (Khan, 2020, pp. 12). Analyzing UNGA voting behaviour has thus provided invaluable insights with many authors making comparisons of the foreign policy of its member-states.

Recent studies have investigated the foreign policy preferences of states such as Bangladesh (Khan, 2020) and India (Das, 2017), as well as blocs such as the BRICS (Ferdinand, 2014), on a variety of issues via measuring and comparing their voting behaviours at the UNGA. Studies, such as by Kursun & Dal (2017), used UNGA voting to understand the relationship between Turkey and the BRICS countries on various foreign policy issues, while Hosli & Kampen (2015) have used it to understand foreign policy proximities and divergences in supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU).

The study by Khan (2020) states that even though a developing country's position on an issue is most likely determined by "strategic motives, regional/global influence, material incentives, or leadership change", the non-binding nature of UNGA resolutions implies that these factors are less prevalent when a state is deciding how to vote at the UNGA. This means that limitations do arise, as UNGA voting patterns cannot be used to understand the entirety of a state's bilateral and multilateral relationships, being only one aspect indicative of its foreign policy. Thus, while UNGA voting coincidences can hint at overall policy preferences, they are not definitive

indicators of a state's complete foreign policy. They should be treated as one piece of a larger puzzle that includes economic, political, and regional dynamics. However, Khan (2020, pp.3) observes that "The voting records broadly reflect where a country stands, with whom it stands and for what purpose" providing insights into the "political proximity and policy inclinations of a state". Das (2017, p. 1 - 2) also points out that analyzing UNGA voting behaviour can generally be relied upon to indicate a state's policy preferences in congruence with its strategic motivations. This means a state's vote at the UNGA is a useful measure of its interests even though external pressures are less likely to alter its voting behaviour.

1.2. Small States and Multilateralism

While various studies on the UNGA have provided insights on the foreign policy inclinations of many states, *small states* are of particular interest due to their reliance on multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) to amplify their voices on the global stage (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017, p. 13 - 14).

Although small states may seem to be limited by resources and capability, contemporary perspectives suggest that factors like economic openness, sovereignty, political cohesion, and strategic importance compensate for a state's size and power (Chong & Maass, 2010; Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017, p. 3 - 4). Traditional perspectives have cast doubt on their perceived influence, suggesting that they are inconsequential compared to the influence of major powers (Chong & Maass, 2010). This view is now outdated as small states derive power from unconventional sources, such as diplomacy, economic strategies, and soft power, rather than on traditional military might (Chong & Maass, 2010; Khan, 2020, p. 3 - 4). Small states often find themselves navigating complex international dynamics, where they must balance their sovereignty with the influence exerted by more powerful nations – resulting in a need to embrace multilateralism as a method of advancing their interests whilst appeasing more powerful states (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017, pp. 2). Unlike major powers, small states often lack the resources and influence to pursue unilateral policies, making institutions like the UNGA an essential arena for them to balance their sovereignty with the pressures exerted by larger nations. What this means is that UNGA voting can be influenced by such factors as economic diplomacy, regional diplomacy, or leadership strategies that go beyond what traditional international relations theories would predict. Small states align themselves with certain blocs or adopt voting behaviours that signal solidarity with key allies, secure foreign

aid, or support ideological stances, even if these decisions do not strictly enhance their security (Chong & Maass, 2010).

1.3. Sri Lanka as a Small State

Since joining the UN in 1955, *Sri Lanka* has continued to be a compelling case of a small state strategically navigating external pressures to secure its national interests, particularly given its geographically significant location in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Positioned at the crossroads of key maritime routes, Sri Lanka's location has long held strategic importance, from the ancient Silk Road to World War II. Thus, in the years following its independence, Sri Lanka has had to leverage its unique geopolitical position in order to maintain its security and sovereignty in the historically contested IOR (Gunasekara, 2015, p. 213 – 214). In this period of the cold war, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a significant force and Sri Lanka's voting behaviour in the UNGA generally adhered with NAM principles (Mital, 2016).

In the 21st century, Sri Lanka has faced a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, with increased engagement from major powers seeking to expand their influence (Nandy & Naha, 2023). This is mainly due to its aforementioned strategic position within the Indian Ocean, which if leveraged, can become a major economic and military asset to whomever controls it (Kawshalya, 2020, p. 158 – 164; Kandaudahewa, 2023, pp. 121; Nandy & Naha, 2023).

Major powers have thus made efforts to gain influence over the Sri Lankan state. *China* has already provided financing and invested in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as deep-water ports along the southern and western coasts (Scott, 2008, pp. 7; De Silva, 2018, Nandy & Naha, 2023). *Russia* and China have both provided valuable diplomatic support to Sri Lanka during the armed separatist conflict and in the immediate post-conflict period (Abeyagoonsekera, 2021; Samaranayaka, 2011, pp. 136). *India*, being a regional power due to its geographical proximity, has always played an important role in both the internal and external affairs of Sri Lanka, has in the post-conflict period recalibrated its approach after the end of the armed conflict, providing important financial assistance and infrastructure development in recent years (De Silva, 2018, Nandy & Naha, 2023). The *United States* (US) has also shown keen interest in the strategic importance of the island and is Sri Lanka's largest export market, thus being significant to the country's economy (Department of Commerce, 2024, May 8; Eudon, 2024).

However, despite Sri Lanka maintaining an overall foreign policy posture based on its principles associated with the NAM, it is described rather as having fluctuated in terms of its dealings with major powers (Kandaudahewa, 2023, pp. 125). President Mahinda Rajapaksa's tenure (2005 – 2015) is seen as having increased cooperation and preferences for China, with a distancing in relationships with India and the West (Dharmawardhane, 2016, p. 1 - 2). The following administration of President Maithripala Sirisena (2015 – 2019) is described as having a more balanced approach, not necessarily pulling away from China, but expanding cooperation with other powers such as India and the Western states (Dharmawardhane, 2016, p. 30 – 31). The subsequent administrations under Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2019 – 2022) and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2022 – 2024) are described as having pursued increasingly hedging and balancing policies to navigate pressures within a tenuous geopolitical situation (Kandaudahewa, 2023, p. 122 - 124).

In this midst, Sri Lanka is caught in a tense geopolitical predicament, attempting to navigate between these powers without alienating or aligning with any one of them. While Sri Lanka's exact foreign policy posture has been difficult to discern, altering under the different political administrations, it has been labelled with terms such as balancing or hedging, and is seen as having been driven by the desire to maintain neutrality in the region, while engaging with all global and regional powers based on national and strategic interests (Aryasinha, 2023; Kandaudahewa, 2023). Balancing domestic interests and economic partnerships with the geopolitical realities of an increasingly competitive international landscape (Kandaudahewa, 2023). Sri Lanka has to carefully manage its relations with these powers which are vying for access to its strategic ports and waters while ensuring that no long-term agreements undermine its sovereignty or national interests. Failure to do so risks making Sri Lanka a focal point in a geopolitical contest, already seemingly a victim of a "zero-sum-game" (Aryasinha, 2023).

1.4. Examining Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy through UNGA Voting

The only available studies that compare Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the UNGA with that of other states was conducted by HSS Nissanka (1976, 1984), who initially studied the voting coincidences in the UNGA between Sri Lanka and other states from 1956 to 1959 in the book *The Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka under S.W.R.D Bandaranaike* (Nissanka, 1976). In a subsequent book, titled *Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy: A Study in non-alignment* (Nissanka, 1984), he expanded this to study Sri Lanka's voting coincidences in the UNGA between 1956 and 1976.

Nissanka's (1976, 1984) studies found that economic considerations and the desire to promote co-operation were crucial factors behind Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the time, stating that the policy of non-alignment was clearly reflected in the voting coincidence rates (Nissanka, 1976, p. 81 – 97). He identifies that Sri Lanka's voting correlation with Yugoslavia during this time was 100%, alongside significant voting alignments with India, Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia, demonstrating a strong commitment to the NAM (p. 214 – 215). He also highlights the shift in Sri Lanka's voting behaviour following the election of J.R. Jayewardene's government in 1977. Thus noting that "Sri Lanka under Jayewardene had a voting correlation of 27% with the USA" while "Mrs Bandaranaike had only a voting correlation of 9% with the USA". "In 1976, voting correlation with the USSR was at 80%, and in 1977 it had been brought down to 64%", while in the same period "her voting correlation with the UK had increased from 23% in 1976 to 35% in 1977 (Nissanka, p. 214 – 215).

Despite providing valuable insights into Sri Lanka foreign policy at the time, no subsequent investigation or comparison of Sri Lanka's voting behaviour with other states at the UNGA is available. In addition to Sri Lanka witnessing a separatist conflict, the global context and the geopolitical situation in the region has altered dramatically since the study by Nissanka 40 years ago, however, little attention has been paid to Sri Lanka's foreign policy adaptations in response to these modern geopolitical rivalries in terms of its voting in multilateral bodies.

Studying the UNGA voting behaviour of Sri Lanka in the more recent period could provide a lens through which to understand Sri Lanka's contemporary relationships with major powers as well as its foreign policy inclinations, providing potential insights on its policy positions and the nuances in its bilateral relationships with major powers.

2.0. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Understanding UNGA Voting Behaviour

The different theories of international relations offer contrasting perspectives on how voting behaviour at the UNGA may be interpreted, which can be useful in explaining the behavioural aspects underlying these voting patterns (Khan, 2020). *Realists* would focus solely on states acting purely out of their own self-interest, even in a multilateral setting like the UNGA, focusing on how states might use their votes to secure allies, advance their economic interests, or enhance their security (Hosli & Kampen, 2015). On the other hand, *Liberal* perspectives would highlight the potential for cooperation, where states vote together to promote similar

interests on issues they find common (Hosli & Kampen, 2015; Khan, 2020). Alternatively, *Constructivists* would emphasise the role of shared norms in shaping states' voting behaviour (Hosli & Kampen, 2015). They might look for patterns that indicate the influence of socialisation within the UNGA or the impact of particular norms, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Khan, 2020).

2.2. Considerations in Analysing Voting Coincidence

Most resolutions within any given UNGA session are passed without a vote, with only resolutions on some contentious issues being sent for roll-call voting (being voted upon by each of the member states), “on average there are between 60 and 150 such votes in any one year” (Ferdinand, 2014, pp. 380). On any given resolution voted upon, a member state can either vote “Yes”, “No”, “Abstain” or might be “Absent” at the vote. According to Ferdinand (2014, p. 379 - 380), the average of ‘Yes’ votes for all resolutions at the UNGA between 1974 and 2008 is 83.7%, reflecting long standing consensus amongst most UNGA member states to support most resolutions.

A study by Hosli & Kampen (2015) which looks at voting correspondence between the European Union (EU) members differentiates two realms of issues that can exist in the UNGA, these being "high politics" issues, such as peace and security, and "low politics" issues, such as economics and trade. Developing countries are generally assumed to prefer these "low politics" issues in multilateral forums such as the UNGA as they are able to take their own position without risking the ire of any major power (Khan, 2020; Hosli & Kampen, 2015). However, Khan's (2020) study offers a contrasting perspective which suggests that developing countries, even small ones, can and do maintain consistent and independent positions on certain “high politics” issues, particularly those related to international peace and security. Khan (2020) exemplified this by pointing out that Bangladesh takes a *principled position* on issues like disarmament and non-proliferation, seeming to disregard strategic interests, diverging from the positions of regional powers like India and China.

Voeten (2023, p. 206 - 211) additionally provides certain theoretical explanations that should be considered when formulating a methodology to study UNGA voting behaviour.

The first concerns *abstentions*, which are described as “extremely common” and while they can be interpreted as a half-hearted support for a resolution, are generally considered by researchers to indicate a sign of disapproval that does not carry the weight or extremity of an

outright “No” (Voeten, 2023, pp. 206 - 211). This view is backed by Khan (2020, pp. 5), who also highlights that the “predominant view” of *abstaining* is that it is a way of disapproving without the strong sentiment that comes from voting “No”. The U.S. Department of State (2022, p. 15 - 16), mentions that while their early annual reports did not include *abstentions*, they now count abstentions as they provide “more nuance to the voting coincidence metric”. Hence, both Khan (2020) and the U.S. Department of State (2022) count *abstentions* as a half point (0.5), which indicates the position of a state as halfway between a Yes and No.

It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State (2022, p. 15 - 16) also counts *absences* as a half-point, citing that *absences* could be motivated for “political” reasons. However, *absences* are excluded by Khan (2020, pp. 5) as the “reasons for a country’s absence can be purposeful or situational”, i.e. A country being absent for a vote may not always indicate political motives and thus can call into question the validity of the results.

Another important aspect to consider when analyzing UNGA voting behaviour is that of the frequency of votes, which Voeten (2023) refers to as *dynamics*. It is pointed out that voting coincidence can sometimes be misleading in indicating foreign policy preferences as sometimes a coincidence rate might be affected by a change in the UN agenda (the list of roll-call resolutions of a session being altered), and not always the country’s foreign policy preference. Voeten (2023) illustrates this by pointing out that a coincidence rate can be significantly affected by the fact in one session of the UNGA there may have been an increased number of resolutions on a given case as opposed to other sessions. Thus, prospective studies are advised to implement fixed parameters when considering how many resolutions per issue category from each specific UNGA are considered.

Another insight by Voeten (2023, p. 207) is the concept of *dimensionality*, which refers to the number of factors influencing a state’s voting behaviour considered in an analysis. The dimensions within which UNGA voting behaviour is analysed can significantly influence the interpretation of voting patterns. While a one-dimensional analysis may be simpler, it often lacks the explanatory depth needed to capture the complexities and nuances surrounding voting behaviour (Voeten, 2023, p. 207). To address this, Voeten (2023) suggests incorporating additional dimensions to provide a more layered understanding of voting behaviour.

Lastly, Voeten (2023) states that an analysis of how often countries vote the same way at the UN to gauge their foreign policy alignment can be problematic when interpreting these voting patterns as evidence of shared interests. UNGA resolutions are based on specific issues, such

as human rights or nuclear weapons, and reflect broader issue based ideological positions rather than direct cooperation or alliances. These patterns indicate how much countries' preferences align on global matters, not their strategic or political relationships. Therefore, UNGA voting behaviours reveal ideological similarities but may not necessarily reflect shared national interests.

3.0. Research Focus

Considering the above context, this study proposes to ascertain Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with major powers at the UNGA in order to better understand and gain potential insights into Sri Lanka's foreign policy inclinations as well as its bilateral relationships with major powers. It focuses specifically on the period after 2009, as the altered foreign policy paradigm of Sri Lanka following the ending of the armed separatist conflict was to allow the country greater latitude, if it chose to, in making decisions. Thus, this study covers sessions of the UNGA between 2009 and 2024 (being the 64th session through to the 78th session) (United Nations, 2024).

3.1. Major Powers in Focus

States such as the five permanent (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - *United States of America* (US), *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* (UK), *French Republic* (France), *Russian Federation* (Russia), *People's Republic of China* (China) - as well as the *Republic of India* (India), become highly relevant when analyzing contemporary voting behaviour at the UNGA (Alburquerque & da Costa, 2020; Gowan, 2018; Jash, 2017). The P5 states in addition to India exert significant influence on global politics, and their impact on smaller states' foreign policy preferences is substantial. The dynamics generated by these major powers has influenced global economic development, decision-making processes, and polarized public discourse (Gowan, 2018; Jash, 2017).

The P5 members, as permanent UNSC members with veto power, wield considerable global authority. Their ability to shape international outcomes through military, economic, and diplomatic means often influences how states behave. Smaller or developing countries often find themselves navigating between the P5 members to secure foreign aid, economic benefits, or political support (Gowan, 2018). Russia and China, also being members of the BRICS (Russia, India, China, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates), are increasingly assertive in international forums, promoting multipolarity and

advocating for the interests of the Global South (Albuquerque & da Costa, 2020; Ferdinand, 2014, pp. 379; Jash, 2017, 2021).

In more recent years, India, an emerging global power being a member of both the BRICS countries and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), has also exercised similar influence on small states (Jash, 2017, 2021).

To reiterate, this study aims to measure and analyse the UNGA voting coincidence rates between Sri Lanka, and the Permanent 5 members of the UNSC and India (hereon referred to as the *P5+India*), as these are the major powers in global affairs that have shown direct interest and have exerted pressure on Sri Lanka.

This study also looks briefly at Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with the original BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to further extrapolate its alignments in the UNGA.

3.2. UNGA Cases Selected

In order to discern Sri Lanka's foreign policy inclinations and gain understanding of each its relationships with the *P5+India*, this study has chosen certain contemporary and salient issues brought before the UNGA. It is important to note that scholars find that the type of issue is a strong determinant of the voting behaviour, with the voting coincidence rates between countries being strongly dependent on the issue being voted upon (Khan, 2020; Das, 2017). While similar studies have categorized resolutions based on an overall issue they pertain to, such as nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament (Khan 2020; Das, 2017), this study will choose cases based on their correspondence to the three Pillars of the UN; these being *Pillar 1 - Peace and Security (P1)*, *Pillar 2 - Human Rights (P2)* and *Pillar 3 – Development (P3)*. Each Pillar represents a distinct dimension of global governance and provides unique insights into Sri Lanka's foreign policy decisions and diplomatic engagements at the UNGA.

Table 1: Cases Studied

Issue Category (3 Pillars)	Cases
(P1) Peace and Security	Russo-Ukraine Crisis
	Chagos Archipelago Dispute
	Israel-Palestine Crisis
(P2) Human Rights	Human Rights in the DPRK
	Human Rights in Iran
	Human Rights in Myanmar
(P3) Development	Trade and Finance
	Migration
	Cybersecurity

Source: Adopted by the Author based on the three Pillars of the UN.

Pillar 1: Peace and Security

Cases under this Pillar address issues of conflict resolution, state sovereignty, and geopolitical stability—key concerns for Sri Lanka as it seeks to maintain regional security and diplomatic neutrality amidst major power rivalries.

1. **Israel-Palestine Crisis:** This conflict, which dates back to 1948, encompasses issues of sovereignty, human rights, and international law. All P5 members are involved due to geopolitical alliances and strategic interests, with especially the US being a staunch supporter of Israel. Russia and China back Palestine's statehood, as does India, which however tries to balance ties with both Israel and Palestine. The UK and France, while mostly supporting Palestine in the UNGA, still maintain good relations with Israel. Sri Lanka, while advocating for a two-state solution, has consistently supported Palestine at the UNGA and co-chairs the Israeli Practices Committee since 1989 (Hatuel-Radoshitzky, 2017; Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN, 2023).
2. **Chagos Archipelago Dispute:** This case centres on the UK's continued control of the Chagos Archipelago and the strategic Diego Garcia Naval Facility operated by the US.

This case is important as it concerns the issues of decolonization and self-determination, principles that Sri Lanka advocates for diplomatically, while is also of significant strategic importance to both the US and UK. Sri Lanka has abstained on the UNGA resolutions concerning this issue, reflecting a pragmatic approach to balancing ideological positions with Western relationships (Harris, 2023).

3. **Russo-Ukraine Crisis:** This ongoing conflict involves territorial sovereignty and highlights broader tensions between Russia and the Western powers, engaging all P5 members and India. For Sri Lanka, it poses a test of its traditional non-aligned stance. Abstaining on all UNGA resolutions except one, where it opposed a resolution concerning Crimea in December 2019 (Davies, 2024; Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN, 2022).

Pillar 2: Human Rights

Cases under this Pillar revolve around safeguarding fundamental rights and addressing violations, often placing Sri Lanka in difficult diplomatic positions as it navigates pressures from global powers on account of the human rights condemnations in relation to Sri Lanka.

1. **Human Rights in DPRK:** Resolutions addressing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) human rights record highlights tensions between Western nations advocating for accountability and China protecting its strategic ally (Cohen, 2015). Sri Lanka's alternating voting behaviour here—between opposition, abstention, and support.
2. **Human Rights in Iran:** Geopolitical divisions within the P5 over the Islamic Republic of Iran's human rights record demonstrate the complexities of balancing criticism with strategic interests. Sri Lanka's varied voting behaviour here, including instances of opposition and abstentions, illustrate an effort maintain non-alignment.
3. **Human Rights in Myanmar:** This case regarding human rights in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar involves significant engagement from China, India, and the US, each holding distinct stances on the conflict. Sri Lanka's consistent opposition or abstention on UNGA resolutions concerning this case reflects its emphasis on sovereignty and its caution against external interference in domestic affairs.

Pillar 3: Development

Cases under this Pillar encompass the realms of economic growth, trade, technological advancements, and equitable development—areas critical for Sri Lanka’s socio-economic resilience and global integration. These cases are based on issue areas upon which there are resolutions being voted on in the UNGA (Appendix).

1. **Trade and Finance:** This case concerns UNGA resolutions pertaining to the international financial system, economics and trade. Sri Lanka supporting resolutions in this area demonstrates its efforts to navigate global economic challenges and secure strategic partnerships.
2. **Migration:** This case concerns the UNGA resolutions addressing migration development and the security of migrants (Guild & Grant, 2017; Thouez, 2018). Migration is a vital issue for Sri Lanka due to its significant expatriate workforce contributing to the national economy.
3. **Cybersecurity:** This case revolves around UNGA resolutions concerning security issues arising from developments in telecommunications as well as countering the use of new technologies in criminal purposes. The UN has significantly shaped cybersecurity rules, with the voting behaviour on these issues revealing divisions concerning global internet governance (Fan, 2024; Henderson, 2021). Sri Lanka voted in favour of these resolutions, underscoring its position to promote global cooperation on digital governance.

4.0. Methodology

As outlined previously, the scope of this study is confined to the votes that took place in the UNGA between and including the 64th and 78th sessions (covering the period September 2009 – August 2024), hence, only specific roll-call resolutions from these sessions and relevant to the selected cases were considered. A catalogue of all resolutions considered in this study can be found in the *Appendix*.

All data utilized in this study was obtained through the UNGA indexes available online at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (United Nations, 2024). The library’s resources were instrumental in accessing voting records relevant to the selected cases and timeframe. These indexes provided comprehensive records of UNGA resolutions, roll-call votes, and related documents, ensuring that the data is both accurate and reliable for the analysis of voting patterns.

4.1. Measuring Voting Coincidence

The method utilised to calculate the voting coincidence measures the number of times voting between two countries' on UNGA resolutions is either the same, partial or opposed. Through this method, UNGA voting behaviour on a resolution between two states is categorized into four groups: same, opposite, partial, and absent:

1. Same: Both countries vote identically (e.g., yes/yes, no/no, or abstain/abstain) receiving **1** point.
2. Opposite: The countries vote opposing (e.g., one votes yes and the other no), receiving **0** points.
3. Partial: One country abstains while the other votes decisively (yes or no), receiving **0.5** points.
4. Absent: In line with both the U.S. Department of State (2022) and Khan (2020), instances where one country does not vote on a relevant resolution are excluded from the final coincidence rate.

The voting coincidence score is determined by summing all the points from the votes, dividing the total by the number of votes, and expressing the result as a percentage (multiplying by 100).

This method of calculation makes it straightforward to compare the voting behaviours as opposed to methods such as the Agreement Index or S-Score (Hosli et al., 2010; Ferdinand 2014; Kursun & Dal, 2017). This method of measuring voting coincidence is used frequently, such as in the annual voting coincidence report published by the United States Department of State (U.S. Department of State 2022, p. 13 - 15) and the study by Khan (2020, pp. 5). This approach also accounts for abstentions as a distinct category, recognizing their nuanced role in signalling neutrality or disagreement and offers a balanced framework for comprehending voting behaviour (Voeten, 2023).

4.2. Interpretation of Voting Coincidence Rates

This study has formulated specific Coincidence Levels in order provide a structured classification for the coincidence rates. This will aid in understanding and analysing the degree of agreement between Sri Lanka and P5+India on each of the cases.

Table 2: Coincidence Levels

Coincidence Rate	Level of Coincidence	Indicates
0%	No Coincidence	Indicates completely opposing positions on the resolutions pertaining to the case
1% - 25%	Extremely Low Coincidence	Indicates opposing positions on case with either few abstentions by one state or few “same” votes on some resolutions pertaining to the case
26% - 39%	Low Coincidence	Indicates some opposing positions on case with either a few “same” votes on a few resolutions or one state abstaining on most of the resolutions.
40% - 79%	Moderate Coincidence	Indicates agreement in the positions of the two states on case albeit with either some differing positions on particular resolutions or one state abstaining.
80% - 100%	High Coincidence	Indicates high levels of agreement in the positions of the two states on case, with either a few or no deviations.

Source: Adopted by the Author.

4.3. Application of Theoretical Insights

This study will apply Voeten’s (2023) insight regarding *abstentions*, considering them as means of not supporting certain resolutions without showing direct opposition. Thus, *abstaining* (which would result in coincidence rates at around 50%) will be considered as a disagreement in principle, reflected in the coincidence levels which consider coincidence rates up to 79% to still be “moderate”.

Regarding Voeten’s (2023) point concerning *dynamics*, this study takes the view that despite the potential for coincidence rates being misleading, it is sometimes essential to include additional resolutions in certain years as they reflect critical moments in the evolution of global issues and the UN's agenda. Resolutions are not only a product of the frequency with which issues arise, but also the geopolitical context in which they are adopted. Additional resolutions on certain issues in some years may be reflective of urgent, specific issues that require immediate attention. Thus, not all cases have an equal number of resolutions from each year,

as this study is of the view that missing important resolution can result in equally misleading coincidence rates. Furthermore, as this study is analysing the overall coincidence rate in the timespan (2009-2024), and not a year by year comparison, this issue is less prevalent.

As the period of this study spans four distinct political administrations that governed Sri Lanka (see Section 1.3), *dimensionality* as defined by Voeten (2023) will be accounted for by breaking down the coincidence rates by the four political administrations as defined in Table 3 (Presidential Secretariat, n.d.). This will indicate how Sri Lanka’s foreign policy inclinations on the selected cases may have shifted over time and provide nuance to the overall result. Furthermore, the dimensionality factor is addressed through the previously outlined categories (3 Pillars of the UN), which provide an issue centric contextual layer for analysing the voting behaviour.

Table 3: Political Administrations of Sri Lanka (2009 – 2024)


Administration	Voting Time Period
Mahinda Rajapaksa Administration	15 September 2009 – 09 January 2015
Maithripala Sirisena Administration	10 January 2015 – 18 November 2019
Gotabaya Rajapaksa Administration	19 November 2019 – 13 July 2022
Ranil Wickramasinghe Administration	14 July 2022 – 21 September 2024

Source: Based on Data from the Presidential Secretariat (Presidential Secretariat, n.d.).

5.0. Results

5.1. P1 – Peace and Security


Figure 1: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with P5+India on Peace and Security (P1)



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

5.2. P2 – Human Rights


Figure 2: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with P5+India on Human Rights (P2) Cases



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

5.3. P3 – Development

Figure 3: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with P5+ India on Development (P3) Cases



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nation, 2024).

6.0. Analysis

6.1. P1 – Peace and Security

Sri Lanka's voting coincidence with the *US*, *UK* and *France* on Pillar 1 cases ranges around the moderate level, with the only exception being with the Israel-Palestine Crisis where its voting coincidence with the US is extremely low and its voting coincidence with the UK and France is high. Sri Lanka's 100% coincidence rate with France on the Chagos Archipelago Dispute which is due to both these states abstaining on the resolutions, and is at 50% with the US and UK on this case. This, in addition to the Russo-Ukraine Crisis, where Sri Lanka also mostly abstains, may highlight diplomatic actions despite ideological differences as an attempt to balance its partnerships with the West.

Sri Lanka's moderate - high voting coincidence rates with *Russia* and especially *China* suggest more proximate foreign policy positions with these states on the Pillar 1 cases. While the coincidence rates seen here may stem from similar ideologies regarding sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs. This can also be also seen as a reflection of Sri Lanka's economic and geopolitical ties with these powers, particularly in light of significant Chinese investments in Sri Lanka's infrastructure as well as being increasingly dependent on Chinese and Russian support in multilateral forums on human rights issues (Abeyagoonsekera, 2021, Ramachandran, 2023).

The higher coincidence rates between Sri Lanka and *India* in Pillar 1 seems to indicate a similar ideology and many shared policy positions on these issues, whilst on the Chagos Archipelago Dispute a divergence appears to exist. This shows that despite India's geographic proximity and shared regional concerns, Sri Lanka maintains its own unique foreign policy outlook, and the high coincidence rate on these international issues may not be stemming from any Indian pressure. This is especially evidenced in the case of the Israel-Palestine Crisis, where the 98.05% coincidence rate with India is the result of changing Indian positions on the issue in recent years, while Sri Lanka's position remained unaltered (Kumaraswamy, 2024). It is noteworthy that on key Israel-Palestine related resolutions such as A/RES/75/96 (Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories), A/RES/77/23 (Division for Palestinian rights of the Secretariat) and A/ES-10/L.30 (Admission of New Members to the

United Nations), India abstained, whereas Sri Lanka voted as it has always done in solidarity with Palestine (Appendix).

Overall, Sri Lanka's voting coincidences in this category illustrates a pragmatic strategy of maintaining neutrality on contentious issues to avoid alienating key partners, thus safeguarding its economic and security concerns. The coincidence rates show that Sri Lanka shares policy inclinations with Russia, China, and India, most likely as a result of their non-interference focused perspectives. Sri Lanka's reliance on these states for economic partnerships, strategic investments, and diplomatic support may also be a motivator. However, in certain instances, Sri Lanka showed it is unwilling to completely oppose the West, seen in the Chagos Archipelago Dispute where Sri Lanka has abstained on the resolutions. Despite this, the coincidence rates show diverging policy positions between Sri Lanka and the US, UK and France in this Pillar. The Israel-Palestine Crisis highlights a strong principled position in favour of Palestinian demands despite its broader cautious diplomacy.

6.2. P2 – Human Rights

Sri Lanka's voting coincidence rates with the *US*, *UK*, and *France* on these Human Rights cases are consistently low across this Pillar, confirming a broader divergence with the policy positions of the US, UK and France on human rights issues. The identical coincidence rates with all three states on this category suggests that Sri Lanka's opposition to Western human rights positions is less about the individual diplomatic relationship with states and more about a systematic divergence in policy preferences, with it being a subject sensitive to Sri Lanka due to its own experience in bodies such as the Human Rights Council. This highlights Sri Lanka's broader resistance to Western-led human rights resolutions, which it perceives as infringing on state sovereignty, as seen in its statement at the UN regarding these issues (Cronin-Furman, 2019; Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, 2024).

Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with *Russia* and *China* range from moderate - high in Pillar 2 cases, demonstrating it has generally similar foreign policy preferences with these states concerning these issues. This suggests mutual positions on state sovereignty over external intervention in human rights matters. This is a reflection not just of Sri Lanka's position on Human Rights issues as seen by its statements at the UN, but also of Sri Lanka's own challenges faced during the post-armed conflict period, indicative of its reliance on Russia and China as diplomatic allies which was pivotal and the broader bilateral relations driven by economic aid,

strategic investments and shared resistance to Western narratives of human rights and interventionism (Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, 2024). Russia's and China's role as a global counterweight to the Western bloc's interventionist agendas may also be enhancing their strategic importance to Sri Lanka (Cronin-Furman, 2019; Ramachandran, 2023).

Sri Lanka's voting coincidence rates with *India* are much higher and consistent across all cases here compared to the previous category (P1). The higher coincidence rates with India are probably reflecting shared principles including non-intervention stemming from their shared NAM associations and historical context, albeit when there are divergences probably arising due to differences from India's broader strategic goals (Mital, 2016; Kumaraswamy, 2024). The latter, might also help explain India's inconsistency in support for votes on Sri Lanka related human rights resolutions in the Human Rights Council in Geneva since 2009.

Overall, this category highlights Sri Lanka's policy preferences for non-intervention resulting in opposition to politicized resolutions on human rights. Sri Lanka's foreign policy posture as understood through the coincidence rates seems to be calculated between securing sovereignty, leveraging strategic partnerships, and managing sensitivities around human rights.

6.3. P3 – Development

Sri Lanka exhibits high coincidences with *France* (87.5%) and the *UK* (87.5%) on Trade and Finance, suggesting notable convergence in policy preferences. However, divergences also persist, potentially stemming from differing ideologies in certain areas. The complete lack of coincidence with the *US* (0%) underscores their stark differences in policy preferences in this domain. Moderate coincidences with France (70%) and the UK (70%) on Migration point to agreement on specific aspects of migration policy, while diverging on other aspects. Again, the complete lack of coincidence with the US (0%) reflects fundamental disagreements likely as a result of differing approaches to migration governance and geopolitical considerations. Sri Lanka's minimal coincidences on Cybersecurity with France (21.43%) and the UK (14.29%) reveal significant policy divergences on issues such as data privacy, and security norms. The absence of any coincidence with the US (0%) on the Cybersecurity emphasizes the stark differences in cybersecurity policy preferences with the West, likely influenced by Sri Lanka's preference for decentralized and inclusive global digital governance frameworks (Thouez, 2018; Navaratna, 2020).


Sri Lanka demonstrates strong voting coincidence with *Russia*, *China*, and *India* on the Trade and Finance case, again reflecting shared ideologies on global financial frameworks. On Migration, Sri Lanka maintains strong voting coincidences with Russia and China, suggesting mostly aligned preferences for frameworks that balance control, regulate migration, and establish the rights of migrants. This highlights Sri Lanka's preference for policies emphasizing equitable burden-sharing and development-focused migration governance. Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with China (100%) and Russia (100%) in the Cybersecurity case highlight shared policy preferences on the governance of cyberspace. These align with resistance to Western norms of internet governance and cybersecurity practices (Thouez, 2018; Navaratna, 2020; Fan, 2024). These alignments reflect shared priorities on economic interests of developing countries and the global economic order.

Sri Lanka exhibited high voting coincidences with Russia, China and India, reflecting strong policy proximities on the cases in this Pillar. Emphasizing Sri Lanka's shared foreign policy preferences with these states. Conversely, low coincidences with the US underscore significant policy divergences on global economic governance, migration and digital policies. However, moderate coincidences with France and the UK on certain cases signals agreement on most resolutions and highlights the differing policy preferences on some issues amongst the Western powers.

6.4. Analysis of Cases by Political Administrations


A breakdown of the coincidence rates by administration is presented to ascertain the changes over time in Sri Lanka's coincidence rates with the P5+India. It must be noted that the number of resolutions adopted under each of the administrations have varied, and hence, the percentage calculation is only indicative of a trend. Furthermore, the *Chagos Archipelago Dispute* is not included here, as only two resolutions exist for that case and both were voted upon during the Maithripala Sirisena administration, thus the coincidence rates would be the same as seen in *Figure 1*.

Figure 4: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Russo-Ukraine Crisis




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 5: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Israel-Palestine Crisis




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 6: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Human Rights Situation in the DPRK




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 7: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Human Rights Situation in Iran




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 8: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Human Rights Situation in Myanmar




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 9: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Trade and Finance




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 10: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Migration



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 11: Voting Coincidence by Administration on Cybersecurity



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Mahinda Rajapaksa Administration

On Pillar 1 cases, the *Mahinda Rajapaksa* administration exhibited high voting coincidences with Russia, China, and India. Conversely, coincidence rates with the US, UK, and France remained moderate to low (with the exception being the UK and France on the Israel-Palestine Crisis), signalling divergence between position of these states and Sri Lanka on these issues. In the Russo-Ukraine Crisis, the administration adopted positions aligned with China and India by abstaining on the resolution, with moderate coincidence rates with the other states, reflecting a broader strategic orientation to not explicitly side with the vested parties.

On Pillar 2 cases, Sri Lanka recorded a coincidence rate of 62.5% with Russia and China regarding the case of the Human Rights Situation in the DPRK, with extremely high coincidence with these powers on the Iran and Myanmar cases. A 37.5% coincidence with the US, UK and France on the Human Rights Situation in the DPRK case due to voting “No” instead of the usual “Abstention” on the last vote under this administration and no coincidence on the Iran or the Myanmar cases. This illustrates a position that aligns more closely with Russia and China on these issues.

Pillar 3 cases again show that this administration’s policy inclination aligned more with Russia, China and India, with high coincidence rates across with these states the three cases, contrasted by low-moderate coincidences with the West.

Maithripala Sirisena Administration

Broadly, the *Maithripala Sirisena* administrations voting behaviour marked a shift towards the West. The overall coincidence with the US, UK, and France saw an increase, while the coincidences with Russia, China and India saw a marginal decline, signalling Sri Lanka’s attempts to balance its diplomatic stances on contentious issues.

However, this is not evident in Pillar 1, where the coincidences remained largely unchanged from the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, with the support for Palestine and abstentions on the Russo-Ukraine crisis continuing, where Sri Lanka maintained a cautious posture without choosing a side. This administration also voted to abstain on the two resolutions concerning the Chagos Archipelago Dispute (A/RES/71/292 and A/RES/73/295) which came up during

this period, breaking with Sri Lanka's stance on decolonization, and an indication that it moved away from its traditional NAM alignments.

On Pillar 2 cases, the rebalancing effort was more apparent, with coincidence rates with the US, UK and France range between moderate and high. This is contrasted with a distancing from Russia and China, with coincidence rates dropping to 0% for the votes on the Human Rights Situation in the DPRK and only 50% for Iran and Myanmar respectively. It is noteworthy that this was also a period when Sri Lanka was to significantly change its approach to its own Human Rights concerns by co-sponsoring UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution 30/1 (Verité Research, 2018).

On the Pillar 3 cases, the voting coincidence was high with the UK, France, Russia, China, and India, indicating that the policy positions on these issues remained consistent with that of these powers. The exception was the case of Cybersecurity, where Sri Lanka's position was more aligned with Russia, China and India. It is notable however that coincidence with the US on all cases was at 0%, indicating that positions within the West are also not aligned on these issues.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa Administration

The Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration saw a partial return to the Non-Western orientation characteristic of the Mahinda Rajapaksa era. Notably, this administration initially aligned with Russia during the Russo-Ukraine Crisis by opposing resolution A/RES/76/179 (Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine), only to revert to abstaining on subsequent resolutions following the escalation of the conflict in February 2022. This strategic shift likely reflected an attempt to navigate geopolitical tensions, while avoiding alienation from Western partners. A noteworthy shift that can be seen here is the slight drop in coincidence with India on the Israel-Palestine Crisis as a result of India changing its policy and abstaining on certain key resolutions.

On the votes regarding the Human Rights Situation in the DPRK, Iran, and Myanmar, the voting coincidences suggested renewed positioning with Russia, China and India, with low coincidence rates with Western powers reflecting opposition to their positions on these issues. This came at a time when Sri Lanka had withdrawn co-sponsorship of Resolution 30/1 at the UNHRC, thus having to rely more on the support of Russia and China in particular.

Pillar 3 again remained unchanged, with high coincidences with all other powers except the US, with positions aligning more with Russia, China and India on the case of Cybersecurity.

Ranil Wickremesinghe Administration

Overall, the Wickremesinghe administration, while showing a slight rebalancing, continued to exhibit a stronger voting coincidence with the Non-Western powers, this was in contrast to the period when Mr. Wickremesinghe was Prime Minister during the Sirisena Presidency.

On Pillar 1, coincidences with Western powers in this case remained distant, with low coincidence levels. On the Russo-Ukraine crisis, the administration maintained the cautious abstention policy, avoiding strong alignments on either side. It is again noteworthy to point out the continuing decrease of coincidence with India on the Israel-Palestine Crisis, indicating that their positions on the issue are beginning to diverge.

The cases in Pillar 2 revealed a continuation of alignment with Russia, China and India. Sri Lanka registered a 100% coincidence rate with Russia, China, and India on the Human Rights Situation in Iran case, reflecting the administration's strategy of prioritizing key partnerships.

Only one case exists under this administration for Pillar 3 due to a lack of resolutions during this period on these issues. The Cybersecurity case again underscores this administration continued policy inclinations with the Non-Western powers on these issues while selectively engaging with Western powers.


Overall, it is clear that Sri Lanka has shown shifts in voting under the changing administrations. Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the nation's voting behaviour was firmly rooted with Russia, China, and India, resisting Western pressures. The Sirisena Presidency marked an attempt to re-engage with the West, rebalancing relations between its traditional Non-Western allies and the Western powers. Later administrations, under President's Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe were to reaffirm ties with the Non-Western bloc, while maintaining the relationship with the West.

Considering the elections of a new President and Parliament in Sri Lanka during the September – November 2024 period, it would be valuable for future research to study how these political changes affect Sri Lanka's voting behaviour in the UNGA what the new administrations voting coincidences with the P5+India would be on these issues.

6.5. Sri Lanka's Voting Coincidence with BRICS countries


Besides the above voting coincidences between Sri Lanka and the P5+India presented above, this study also seeks to present the voting coincidences of Sri Lanka with the original 5 members of the *BRICS* – of which 3 of the 5 countries (China, India and Russia) have already been considered. As Sri Lanka aspires to join the BRICS, it represents a crucial reference point for Sri Lanka's foreign policy, particularly in areas concerning sovereignty, development cooperation, and non-intervention, as the organization challenges Western-led institutions and promotes multipolarity (Albuquerque & da Costa, 2020; Jash, 2017; Nawaz et al, 2024; PTI, 2024). Voting coincidences with BRICS states on these cases may indicate whether Sri Lanka aligns with their broader geopolitical vision or adopts issue-specific stances based on economic, political, and regional considerations.

Figure 12: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with BRICS on Pillar 1 Cases




Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 13: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with BRICS on Pillar 2 Cases



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

Figure 14: Sri Lanka Voting Coincidence with BRICS on Pillar 3 Cases



Source: Compiled by the author based on voting records from the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

On Pillars 1 and 2, Sri Lanka exhibited mostly moderate voting coincidences with the BRICS, indicating similar outlooks on these issues yet with some diverging policy positions. The exception to this are the votes concerning the Israel-Palestine Crisis, where the coincidence rates mostly align. However, Sri Lanka’s voting coincidence with the BRICS on Pillar 3 is very

high, indicating extremely similar stances by these states on the issues concerned, showing that Sri Lanka and BRICS states have high affinity when it comes to issues concerning development and global governance.

Sri Lanka's moderate to high voting coincidence with the BRICS suggests shared policy positions shaped by strategic, economic, and ideological considerations. As a small state, Sri Lanka appears to have forged common ground with BRICS as these states champion multipolarity, and alternative development models. BRICS' states generally oppose Western-led narratives and prescriptive approaches to governance, particularly on issues of sovereignty and human rights. At the same time, alongside other developing countries, the economic influence of BRICS, particularly through trade, investment, and development financing, may have further reinforced this alignment (Albuquerque & da Costa, 2020; Jash, 2017; Nawaz et al, 2024).

7.0. Conclusions

Sri Lanka's voting coincidences at the UNGA with the P5+India suggests foreign policy inclinations characterized by ideological affinity, pragmatic considerations and some principled stances, thus reflecting Sri Lanka's efforts to navigate a complex and evolving geopolitical landscape. In this context, Sri Lanka's voting seems to indicate a complex interplay concerning sovereignty, global cooperation, and strategic calculation which underscores the dynamics of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. This appears to have been influenced by both domestic considerations and external pressures.

Sri Lanka's experience seems to confirm the notion of small states leveraging multilateralism and strategic diplomacy to protect sovereignty and secure their interests in an asymmetric global order (Chong & Maass, 2010; Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017). This illustrates that voting in the UNGA, which is non-binding, allows states to seek to maintain their broader foreign policy positions without jeopardizing their bilateral relationships.

While in traditional diplomatic interactions states sometimes compromise on their core values, norms, and positions to maintain bilateral relationships, at the UNGA, they have the freedom to assert their true policy preferences without immediate consequences. This dynamic is most evident in Sri Lanka's voting coincidence with the US - where the low coincidence rates found do not reflect the significant diplomatic and economic ties between the two states.

This underscores the limitations of interpreting foreign policy through UNGA voting patterns alone as these voting patterns do not inherently reveal the motivations behind Sri Lanka's decisions, nor do they accurately reflect the complexities of its bilateral relationships. Without analysing the circumstances around the political calculations behind each vote and examining Sri Lanka's bilateral relationship with these major powers in greater depth, the numbers alone provide an incomplete picture.

Future studies should also pay closer attention to the interpretation of *abstentions*, which this study, consistent with other comparisons of UNGA voting behaviours by Ferdinand (2014), Khan (2020) and the U.S. Department of State (2022), has weighted as a 0.5 in calculating the voting coincidence rate. While some analysts such as Voeten (2023) argue that abstentions signal opposition to a resolution, without the country having to face the direct consequences of voting "No", their meaning could be far more ambiguous and can conflate a state's actual position. A state may abstain for various reasons—whether to avoid provoking a major power, to express neutrality, or to signal internal indecision. This means that abstentions, if not carefully analysed, can distort conclusions about a state's actual stance on an issue. In Sri Lanka's case, abstentions seem to serve as a diplomatic tool to avoid controversy rather than an explicit rejection or acceptance of a resolution's content. This introspection concerning abstentions should also be considered with regard to *absences*, which by simply being excluded may not provide the most valid results.

These limitations and concerns notwithstanding, the comparison of voting coincidences has offered valuable insight into Sri Lanka's foreign policy behaviour. The coincidence rates with Russia, China and India reinforce the growing influence of these states on Sri Lanka's external engagements. At the same time, the data reflects Sri Lanka's cautious approach to the West, avoiding outright opposition while maintaining strategic inter-dependence.

Sri Lanka does not, or cannot afford to, isolate itself completely from the West at the UNGA. Trade, development aid, and global financial systems continue to be dominated by the *US*, *UK*, *France* and other European nations, making it necessary to maintain ties, even if the alignment is often measured and selective. While the US remains the most distant, Sri Lanka's slightly higher voting coincidences with France and the UK show certain shared ideologies on some of the issues, as seen in Pillar 3. The voting coincidences also indicate occasional shared positions with Western powers, demonstrating a conscious effort to preserve a degree of engagement and cooperation with the West. Alienating the West could lead to reductions in financial aid or

restriction of exports to these states, which would exacerbate Sri Lanka's economic vulnerabilities. This notwithstanding, Sri Lanka's abstention on votes concerning the Russo-Ukraine Crisis was despite considerable lobbying by the West to support anti-Russia resolutions (CNN, 2022), and consistent support to Palestine on votes concerning the Israel-Palestine Crisis resolutions was despite considerable lobbying by the West to abstain, as India did on occasion (Indian Express, 2024). Following the election of President-elect Donald Trump, how Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with the US in particular might be affected in the UNGA would be worthy of close study.

Sri Lanka's voting coincidences with *Russia* and *China* highlight their shared policy positions across the cases. This observation could be driven by several factors, including historical ties, economic dependencies, and shared perspectives on sovereignty and non-intervention. These states were the primary suppliers of armaments that were instrumental for Sri Lanka's military victory in 2009. In the post-conflict period, Russia and China have also offered Sri Lanka crucial diplomatic support in multilateral forums and have been pivotal economic partners through initiatives such as the BRI. The high voting coincidences seem to also indicate that a cornerstone of Sri Lanka's voting behaviour is a deep-seated commitment to sovereignty. The echoes of history, particularly Sri Lanka's own experiences with external intervention and post-conflict challenges, have made it cautious of resolutions that could be seen as infringing on domestic affairs. These are the most likely reasons for Sri Lanka's high voting coincidences with Russia and China, two powers that champion non-interventionist policies and have, at crucial moments, shielded Sri Lanka from international scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Sri Lanka did not take the same positions as these powers on the votes concerning the Chagos Archipelago Dispute, preferring instead to abstain, consistent with efforts to rebalance Sri Lanka's foreign relations that was prevalent at the time.

While the centrality of *India* in Sri Lanka's foreign policy decision making is often emphasized, the UNGA voting coincidences show a more nuanced relationship, with proximity in the policy positions on these issues often dependent on the context. The coincidence rates seen do suggest shared ideologies and policy positions, albeit divergences exist on some issues where Sri Lanka does maintain distinct foreign policy positions. This is particularly evident on the Israel-Palestine Crisis, where Sri Lanka's consistent stance contrasts with India's recent shifting positions on some crucial votes, despite their overall high coincidence rate. Regardless, Sri Lanka continues to show strong and consistent voting coincidences with India, likely due to

shared principles such as non-intervention rooted in their NAM association. However, India's broader geo-economic interests on global issues may explain some of the divergences in the voting coincidence.

The voting coincidences between Sri Lanka and the original BRICS states show that they are mainly united in their stances concerning Pillar 3 issues, yet do not have uniform positions concerning the issues in Pillars 1 and 2. However, Sri Lanka aligns with the BRICS as it embraces policies that favour emerging economies and reflects the broader shift among developing countries that view *BRICS* as a counterbalance to Western-domination.

Overall, what can be discerned from this study is that Sri Lanka has remained a resilient player in a multifaceted international arena, navigating the pressures of global geopolitics with pragmatism. The coincidence rates seem to tell us that Sri Lanka's voting behaviour at the UNGA is a mix of projecting its norms and values, while also protecting its sovereignty, maintaining economic relations and preserving bilateral partnerships. By balancing principles with its strategic needs in the UNGA, Sri Lanka has sought to secure its position in a rapidly changing world. These foreign policy preferences reveal the challenges faced by small states in asserting their agency amidst the competing pressures of major powers.

Ultimately, while UNGA voting coincidence rates offer a useful indicator of a country's foreign policy inclinations, they should not be taken as a definitive measure of its diplomatic relationships. These patterns must be assessed alongside qualitative analyses of a state's geopolitical interests, bilateral relationships, and internal decision-making processes to fully understand its foreign policy trajectory. When used in conjunction with deeper qualitative research, UNGA voting behaviours have the potential to provide an important piece of the puzzle in evaluating a state's international positioning.

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Appendix: UNGA Voting Data

Data utilised to measure the coincidence rates seen in Figure 1 through Figure 14 can be found below. All of the data was selected via UNGA indexes and related documents available on the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library (United Nations, 2024).

The states have been abbreviated as: Sri Lanka (SL), United States (US), China (CN), India (IN), Russia (RU), Brazil (BR), South Africa (SA), United Kingdom (UK), France (FR).

If a state voted “Yes” to the corresponding resolution, it was assigned the number 1, if the state voted to “Abstain”, it was assigned 0.5, and if it voted “No”, it was assigned 0.

Table 4: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Russo-Ukraine Crisis

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/68/262	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	100-11-58	27/03/2014
A/RES/71/205	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	70-26-77	19/12/2016
A/RES/72/190	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	70-26-76	19/12/2017
A/RES/73/194	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	66-19-72	17/12/2018
A/RES/73/263	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	65-27-70	22/12/2018
A/RES/74/17	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	63-19-66	9/12/2019
A/RES/74/168	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	65-23-83	18/12/2019
A/RES/75/192	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	64-23-86	16/12/2020
A/RES/76/179	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	65-25-85	16/12/2021
A/ES-11/1	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	141-5-34	2/03/2022
A/ES-11/2	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	140-5-38	24/03/2022
A/ES-11/3	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	93-24-58	7/04/2022
A/ES-11/4	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	143-5-35	12/10/2022
A/ES-11/5	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	94-14-73	14/11/2022
A/ES-11/6	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	141-7-32	23/02/2023

Table 5: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Dispute

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y/N/A	Date
A/RES/71/292	0.5	0	0.5	1	0.5	1	1	0	0.5	94-15-65	22/06/2017
A/RES/73/295	0.5	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.5	116-6-56	22/05/2019

Table 6: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Israeli-Palestine Crisis

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y/N/A	Date
A/RES/64/10	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	114-28-44	5/11/2009
A/RES/64/16	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	109-8-55	2/12/2009
A/RES/64/17	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	112-9-54	2/12/2009
A/RES/64/18	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-8-5	2/12/2009
A/RES/64/19	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-7-4	2/12/2009
A/RES/64/20	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-7-5	2/12/2009
A/RES/64/87	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-1-7	10/6/2009
A/RES/64/89	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-4	10/7/2009
A/RES/64/90	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-6-3	10/10/2009
A/RES/64/91	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	92-9-74	10/10/2009
A/RES/64/92	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-6-4	10/10/2009
A/RES/64/93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-7-3	10/10/2009
A/RES/64/94	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-9-5	10/10/2009
A/RES/64/150	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	176-6-3	19/12/2009
A/RES/64/185	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-8-7	21/12/2009
A/RES/65/13	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	112-9-54	30/11/2010
A/RES/65/14	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	110-9-56	30/11/2010
A/RES/65/15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-8-2	30/11/2010
A/RES/65/16	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-4	30/11/2010
A/RES/65/17	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	166-6-4	30/11/2010

A/RES/65/98	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-1-6	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/99	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-4	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/100	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-2	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/101	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-2	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/102	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	94-9-72	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/103	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-2	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/104	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-3	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/105	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-9-2	10/12/2010
A/RES/65/179	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-8-5	20/12/2010
A/RES/65/202	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	177-6-4	21/12/2010
A/RES/66/14	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	115-8-53	30/11/2011
A/RES/66/15	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	114-9-54	30/11/2011
A/RES/66/16	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-8-3	30/11/2011
A/RES/66/17	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-7-4	30/11/2011
A/RES/66/18	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-7-5	30/11/2011
A/RES/66/72	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	160-1-8	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/73	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-7-3	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/74	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-2	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/75	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-2	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/76	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	86-9-75	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/77	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-7-2	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/78	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-7-4	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/79	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-9-4	9/12/2011
A/RES/66/146	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	182-7-3	19/12/2011
A/RES/66/225	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-7-6	22/12/2011
A/RES/67/19	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	1	138-9-41	29/11/2012
A/RES/67/20	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	106-7-56	30/11/2012

A/RES/67/21	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	103-7-61	30/11/2012
A/RES/67/22	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	160-7-7	30/11/2012
A/RES/67/23	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-6-5	30/11/2012
A/RES/67/24	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-7-6	30/11/2012
A/RES/67/114	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	170-1-8	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/115	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	170-6-4	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/116	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	172-6-1	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/117	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	173-6-2	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/118	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	98-8-72	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/119	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	171-6-3	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/120	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-5	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/121	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-8-6	18/12/2012
A/RES/67/158	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	179-7-3	20/12/2012
A/RES/67/229	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	170-7-9	21/12/2012
A/RES/68/12	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	110-7-56	26/11/2013
A/RES/68/13	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	108-7-59	26/11/2013
A/RES/68/14	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-7-7	26/11/2013
A/RES/68/15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-6-6	26/11/2013
A/RES/68/16	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-6-8	26/11/2013
A/RES/68/76	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	173-1-8	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/77	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	170-6-6	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/78	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	170-6-6	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/79	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	172-6-5	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/80	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	95-8-75	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/81	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-7	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/82	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-9	11/12/2013
A/RES/68/83	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-8-8	11/12/2013

A/RES/68/154	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	178-7-4	18/12/2013
A/RES/68/235	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-6-9	20/12/2013
A/RES/69/20	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	94-7-56	25/11/2014
A/RES/69/21	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	91-7-59	25/11/2014
A/RES/69/22	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	147-7-9	25/11/2014
A/RES/69/23	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	148-6-8	25/11/2014
A/RES/69/86	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-1-10	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/87	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-6	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/88	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	166-6-6	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/89	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-6	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/90	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	89-9-79	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/91	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-7-9	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/92	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-7-12	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	158-8-11	5/12/2014
A/RES/69/165	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	180-7-4	18/12/2014
A/RES/69/241	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-6-9	19/12/2014
A/RES/70/12	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	192-8-57	24/11/2015
A/RES/70/13	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	99-8-57	24/11/2015
A/RES/70/14	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	155-7-7	24/11/2015
A/RES/70/15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	155-7-7	24/11/2015
A/RES/70/16	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	153-7-8	24/11/2015
A/RES/70/83	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-1-11	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/84	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-7-7	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/85	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-6-5	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/86	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-7-4	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/87	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	92-9-75	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/88	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-6-8	9/12/2015

A/RES/70/89	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	161-7-8	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/90	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	161-7-8	9/12/2015
A/RES/70/141	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	177-7-4	17/12/2015
A/RES/70/225	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-5-10	22/12/2015
A/RES/71/20	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	100-9-55	30/11/2016
A/RES/71/21	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	98-9-57	30/11/2016
A/RES/71/22	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	153-7-7	30/11/2016
A/RES/71/23	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	153-7-7	30/11/2016
A/RES/71/25	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	149-7-8	30/11/2016
A/RES/71/91	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-1-9	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/92	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	166-6-6	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-5	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/94	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-7-5	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/95	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	91-11-73	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/96	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-6-6	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/97	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-6-7	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/98	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-7-8	6/12/2016
A/RES/71/184	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	177-7-4	19/12/2016
A/RES/71/247	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-7-11	21/12/2016
A/RES/72/11	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	100-10-59	30/11/2017
A/RES/72/12	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	155-8-8	30/11/2017
A/RES/72/13	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	0.5	103-10-57	30/11/2017
A/RES/72/14	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	157-7-8	30/11/2017
A/RES/72/15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	151-6-9	30/11/2017
A/RES/72/80	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-1-12	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/81	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	158-7-10	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/82	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-6-7	7/12/2017

A/RES/72/83	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-7-9	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/84	1	0	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	83-10-77	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/85	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	157-7-10	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/86	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	155-7-12	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/87	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	153-8-10	7/12/2017
A/RES/72/160	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	176-7-4	19/12/2017
A/RES/72/240	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-6-11	20/12/2017
A/RES/73/18	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	100-12-62	30/11/2018
A/RES/73/19	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	156-8-12	30/11/2018
A/RES/73/20	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	152-8-14	30/11/2018
A/RES/73/21	1	0	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	96-13-64	30/11/2018
A/RES/73/22	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	148-11-14	30/11/2018
A/RES/73/92	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-2-13	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	155-6-13	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/94	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-5-12	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/95	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	156-6-14	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/96	1	0	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	78-10-84	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/97	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	158-6-14	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/98	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	154-6-15	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/99	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	152-8-13	7/12/2018
A/RES/73/158	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	172-6-11	17/12/2018
A/RES/73/255	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-7-13	20/12/2018
A/RES/74/10	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	92-13-61	3/12/2019
A/RES/74/11	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	147-7-13	3/12/2019
A/RES/74/12	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	87-23-54	3/12/2019
A/RES/74/13	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	144-8-14	3/12/2019
A/RES/74/84	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-7-11	13/12/2019

A/RES/74/85	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-7	13/12/2019
A/RES/74/86	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	163-6-12	13/12/2019
A/RES/74/87	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	81-13-80	13/12/2019
A/RES/74/88	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	157-7-15	13/12/2019
A/RES/74/89	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	157-9-13	13/12/2019
A/RES/74/139	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-5-11	18/12/2019
A/RES/74/243	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	160-6-15	19/12/2019
A/RES/75/20	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	91-17-54	2/12/2020
A/RES/75/21	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	82-25-53	2/12/2020
A/RES/75/22	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	145-7-9	2/12/2020
A/RES/75/23	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	142-8-11	2/12/2020
A/RES/75/93	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	169-2-7	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/94	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-4-9	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/95	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	160-5-12	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/96	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	76-14-83	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/97	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	150-7-17	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/98	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	147-10-16	10/12/2020
A/RES/75/172	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-5-10	16/12/2020
A/RES/75/236	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	153-6-17	21/12/2020
A/RES/76/10	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	148-9-14	1/12/2021
A/RES/76/12	1	0	1	0.5	1	0.5	1	0.5	1	129-11-31	1/12/2021
A/RES/76/77	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	164-1-10	9/12/2021
A/RES/76/78	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	162-5-6	9/12/2021
A/RES/76/79	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	159-5-8	9/12/2021
A/RES/76/80	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0	0.5	80-18-73	9/12/2021
A/RES/76/82	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	146-7-20	9/12/2021
A/RES/76/150	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-5-10	16/12/2021

A/RES/76/225	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	156-7-15	17/12/2021
A/RES/77/22	1	0	1	1	0.5	0	1	0.5	0.5	101-17-53	30/11/2022
A/RES/77/23	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	0	1	0	0.5	90-30-47	30/11/2022
A/RES/77/24	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	149-11-13	30/11/2022
A/RES/77/25	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	153-9-10	30/11/2022
A/RES/77/122	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	157-5-4	12/12/2022
A/RES/77/123	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	157-1-10	12/12/2022
A/RES/77/124	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	153-6-6	12/12/2022
A/RES/77/126	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	141-7-21	12/12/2022
A/RES/77/187	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	159-8-10	14/12/2022
A/RES/77/208	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	167-6-9	15/12/2022
A/RES/77/247	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	87-26-53	30/12/2022
A/RES/78/73	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	165-4-6	7/12/2023
A/RES/78/74	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	168-1-10	7/12/2023
A/RES/78/75	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	163-5-9	7/12/2023
A/RES/78/76	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	0	0.5	86-12-75	7/12/2023
A/RES/78/78	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	149-6-19	7/12/2023
A/RES/78/170	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	158-6-13	19/12/2023
A/RES/78/192	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	172-4-10	19/12/2023
A/ES-10/L.25	1	0	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	1	120-14-45	27/10/2023
A/ES-10/L.27	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	1	153-10-23	12/12/2023
A/ES-10/L.30	1	0	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	1	143-9-25	10/5/2024
A/ES-10/L.31	1	0	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	1	124-14-43	18/09/2024

Table 7: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Human Rights in the DPRK

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/64/175	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	99-20-63	18/12/2009

A/RES/65/225	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	106-20-57	21/12/2010
A/RES/66/174	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	123-15-51	19/12/2011
A/RES/69/188	0	1	0	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	116-20-53	18/12/2014
A/RES/70/172	1	1	0	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	119-19-48	17/12/2015

Table 8: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Human Rights in the Iran

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/64/176	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	74-49-59	18/12/2009
A/RES/65/226	0	1	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	78-45-59	21/12/2010
A/RES/66/175	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	89-30-64	19/12/2011
A/RES/67/182	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	86-32-65	20/12/2012
A/RES/68/184	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	86-36-61	18/12/2013
A/RES/69/190	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	83-35-68	18/12/2014
A/RES/70/173	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	81-37-67	17/12/2015
A/RES/71/204	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	85-35-63	19/12/2016
A/RES/72/189	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	81-30-70	19/12/2017
A/RES/73/181	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1	84-30-67	17/12/2018
A/RES/74/167	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	81-30-70	18/12/2019
A/RES/75/191	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	82-30-64	16/12/2020
A/RES/76/178	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	78-31-69	16/12/2021
A/RES/77/228	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	80-29-65	15/12/2022
A/RES/78/220	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	78-30-68	19/12/2023

Table 9: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Human Rights in Myanmar Case

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/64/238	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	86-23-39	24/12/2009
A/RES/65/241	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	85-26-46	24/12/2010

A/RES/66/230	0	1	0	1	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	83-21-39	24/12/2011
A/RES/72/248	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	0.5	1	1	122-10-24	24/12/2017
A/RES/73/264	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	1	1	1	136-8-22	22/12/2018
A/RES/74/246	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	1	1	1	134-9-29	27/12/2019
A/RES/75/238	0.5	1	0	0.5	0	1	1	1	1	130-9-26	31/12/2020

Table 10: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Cybersecurity Case

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/71/28	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	181-0-1	5/12/2016
A/RES/73/27	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	0	119-46-14	5/12/2018
A/RES/73/187	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	94-59-33	17/12/2018
A/RES/74/29	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.5	129-6-45	12/12/2019
A/RES/74/247	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	0	79-60-33	27/12/2019
A/RES/75/240	1	0	1	0.5	1	0.5	1	0	0	92-50-21	31/12/2020
A/RES/77/36	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	112-52-8	7/12/2022

Table 11: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Migration Case

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/67/219	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	129-3-49	21/12/2012
A/RES/73/195	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	152-5-12	19/12/2018
A/RES/73/241	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	182-3-2	20/12/2018
A/RES/75/226	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	175-3-1	21/12/2020

Table 12: Voting Behaviour on Resolutions Concerning the Trade and Finance Case

Resolution ID	SL	US	CN	IN	RU	BR	SA	UK	FR	Y-N-A	Date
A/RES/64/188	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0	0	122-47-8	21/12/2009
A/RES/64/189	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	124-3-51	21/12/2009
A/RES/65/142	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	0	0	119-47-7	20/12/2010

A/RES/66/186	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	122-2-53	22/12/2011
A/RES/68/200	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	127-2-50	20/12/2013
A/RES/70/185	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	131-2-49	22/12/2015
A/RES/72/201	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	130-2-48	20/12/2017
A/RES/72/202	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	182-2-0	20/12/2017
A/RES/72/203	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	182-2-0	20/12/2017
A/RES/73/219	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	184-1-0	20/12/2018
A/RES/73/220	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	184-1-0	20/12/2018
A/RES/74/200	1	0	1	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	122-2-51	19/12/2019
A/RES/74/201	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	176-2-0	19/12/2019
A/RES/74/202	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	179-1-0	19/12/2019
A/RES/75/203	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	177-2-0	21/12/2020
A/RES/75/204	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	177-1-0	21/12/2020
A/RES/76/190	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	178-2-0	17/12/2021
A/RES/76/191	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	126-6-46	17/12/2021
A/RES/76/192	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	178-1-0	17/12/2021

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