CHINA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SRI LANKA

DINUSHA PANDITARATNE

NONRESIDENT FELLOW, LAKSHMAN KADIRGAMAR INSTITUTE (LKI)


The opinions expressed in this presentation are solely those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of LKI or any other institution.



Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)




Sri Lanka's Indian Ocean Identity



CALCENTIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES


The Indian Ocean Economy in 2025



Sources: LKI calculations involving 28 IOR states, based on World Bank and IMF databases



Indian Ocean Ports and Strategic Assets




CALCE AND AN ADIRGAMAR INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

China's Commercial Presence in the IOR: Investment




Cumulative Chinese Investment in the Indian Ocean (2005-2018, % of 2018 Nominal GDP)



Sources: LKI calculations based on China Global Investment Tracker and IMF WEO

CALCENTIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Sri Lanka's Inward FDI (US\$ Millions)



Source: Board of Investment, Sri Lanka

CALK I LAKSHMAN KADIRGAMAR INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Colombo Port City

(Colombo International Financial City)





Strongly Supported Concerns

- Lack of a national infrastructure plan, leading to *ad hoc* projects and resulting inefficiencies
- Shortfall in capacity to negotiate investment agreements
- A need to diversify sources of foreign investment
- Weakness of local institutions in tackling corruption



Other Concerns about Investment


- **Concerns Needing Further Study**
- Environmental effects
- □ Impact on local labor and other stakeholders

Weakly Supported Concerns

- 'Dual use' investments
- 'Debt trap' diplomacy



Sri Lanka Central Government Debt by Ownership (End-2018, % of Total)




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report 2018



China's Commercial Presence: Trade and Tourism




Goods Imports by Partner (% of Total 1980-2018)



Sources: LKI calculations involving 28 IOR states, based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics


CALCE AND AN ADIRGAMAR INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Goods Exports by Partner (% of Total 1980-2018)



CALCE AND AN ADDREAMAR INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES


Chinese Tourist Arrivals in Selected IOR States (% of Total Arrivals, 2017)



Source: Various national sources

IONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Tourist Arrivals to Sri Lanka By Source (Thousands)




Source: Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority

LAKSHMAN KADIRGAMAR INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIESI

Navigating Military Trends in the IOR



Military Expenditure



Source: Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database



Naval Vessels Given to Sri Lanka (2004 - 2019)

Year	Gifting Country	Type of Vessel	Receiving Service
2004	US	Medium Endurance Cutter	Sri Lanka Navy
2014	Australia	Two Bay-Class Patrol Boats	Sri Lanka Navy
2015	India	Offshore Patrol Vessel	Sri Lanka Navy
2017		Offshore Patrol Vessel	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
2018	Japan	<u>30m Type Patrol Boat</u> (new)	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
		<u>Two Fast Patrol Vessels</u> (new)	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
2019	Australia	<u>Three Stabicraft vessels</u>	Sri Lanka Coast Guard
	US	Hamilton Class Cutter	Sri Lanka Navy
	China	<u>Type 053H2G Frigate</u> (handed over in Shanghai in June 2019)	Sri Lanka Navy

Source: LKI, drawn from various national sources

CALCENTIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Sri Lanka's Responses to Increasing Militarization of IOR

- 1. Welcoming visits by naval ships from all nations
 - From 2008 to June 2019, 472 naval visits from over 25 nations: 96 from India, 74 from Japan and 39 from China
- 2. Developing its commercial ports and military readiness with a range of partners
 - E.g. Signed a MoU in 2019 with India and Japan to develop a terminal of Colombo port. Naval exercises with India and US
- **3.** Pursuing a collective understanding of the challenges facing the IOR and ways forward
 - Track 1.5 conference on the future of the Indian Ocean in October 2018; possible ministerial conference in 2019

Takeaways

□ Sri Lanka increasingly views the IOR as critical to its own future.

- □ China's commercial presence in the IOR has brought high *investment* from China, raising some valid concerns in Sri Lanka that should be addressed by national and multilateral policy measures.
- By contrast, there is significant potential to grow Sri Lanka's *trade and tourism* from China.
- □ Sri Lanka's main concern as to military presence is the *overall militarization* of the IOR.
- □ To contain risks of that militarization, Sri Lanka is engaging with various strategic partners and encouraging regional dialogue, in line with its non-aligned heritage.

